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Abstract 
The European Monetary Union is characterized by a crisis of governance, this has become more 
evident with the crisis of the euro which has shown the weaknesses of the European institutions and 
stressed the heterogeneity of member countries. 
The global financial crisis struck the euro area very severely because it coincided with the lack of 
appropriate policy tools to manage the crisis and with a period of weak political leadership which 
have made crisis management even harder. Europe needs to build the institutions of its monetary 
union to avoid similar crises in the future. But it is necessary a greater European integration, with 
a central fiscal entity at European level which requires a transfer of sovereignty from the individual 
Member States. This contribution first discusses the issue concerning  rules and discretion in the 
governance of the euro. In the following section it describes the euro crisis and examines the 
remedies put in place, noting that despite the statements and the efforts of the European authorities 
the confidence in the euro is diminishing. Thus the exit of Greece from the euro or even the 
breakdown of the single currency has become a hypothesis discussed more frequently among 
economists, politicians, central bankers and businessmen. The last section of the work focuses on 
what’s wrong in the governance  of the euro and examines the institutional aspects and the 
economic policy issues suggesting that the European integration serves to ensure the European 
citizens independence and protect their historical freedom, but also to influence and thus affect the 
choices from which may depend the future prosperity of European nations involved. 
 
 
Introduction. 
The European Monetary Union is characterized by a crisis of governance, this has become more 
evident with the crisis of the euro which has shown the weaknesses of the European institutions and 
stressed the heterogeneity of member countries; a heterogeneity – according to Martin Feldstein 
(2011) – that includes not only economic structures but also fiscal traditions and social attitudes. 
The members of the European Monetary Union are independent states which have given up their 
own currencies in favor of a joint currency, the euro. Stability of the euro can be assured if the 
economies of the member states tend to be similar in competitiveness, economic growth and fiscal 
policies. Otherwise imbalances between these countries tend to occur, create tensions in the 
currency area and, in the end, endanger the currency union, as Mundell (1961) had already 
maintained. In any case, since its inception the European Monetary Union has shown a preference 
for a political approach to decisions to admit a country as a member of the euro area instead of 
looking exclusively to its economic fundamentals. 
Undoubtedly, the global financial crisis struck the euro area severely because it coincided with the 
lack of appropriate policy tools to manage the crisis and with a period of weak political leadership 
which have made crisis management even harder. 
Barry Eichengreen (2009) has correctly underlined the need for Europe to build out the institutions 
of its monetary union that can avoid similar crises in the future, because the economic  governance 
of the European Monetary Union has remained incomplete and weak. 
But apart from building the appropriate institutions and complete the architecture of the  system, it 
is necessary a greater European integration, which inevitably has a political character. However, the 
European integration serves to ensure the European citizens  –  at a time when only the giants make 
the law and have political power and wealth  – that they can enjoy independence and protect their 
historical freedom, but also to influence and thus affect the choices from which may depend the 
future prosperity of European nations involved. 
___________________________ 
Keywords: Euro, crisis of governance, European integration , European institutions,  economic policies 
JEL classification: F15, F33, F34, F36, F43, O52. 
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This contribution first discusses the issue concerning  rules and discretion in the governance of the 
euro. In the following section it describes the euro crisis and examines the remedies put in place, 
noting that despite the statements and the efforts of the European authorities the confidence in the 
euro is diminishing. Thus the exit of Greece from the euro or even the breakdown of the single 
currency has become a hypothesis discussed more frequently among economists, politicians, central 
bankers and businessmen. The last section of the work focuses on what’s wrong in the governance  
of the euro and examines the institutional aspects and the changes required and the economic policy 
issues. All the proposals demand a stronger European political integration where the European 
institutions are able to implement the economic policy for the entire euro area. 
 
 
2. Rules and discretion in the governance of the euro. 
 
The governance of the euro has been characterized by the centralization of monetary policy and by 
decentralization of fiscal policy. The advent of the single currency has involved the transfer of 
monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB has in any case a limited 
liability and a very narrow remit, which is to look after the stability of the euro. In order to fulfill 
the maintenance of stability of prices, the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, has given to the ECB a 
complete institutional independence
1
. This institutional independence is, according to mainstream 
economic theory (e.g. Barro and Gordon,1983), a prerequisite to ensure the credibility of monetary 
policy (Schilirò, 2006). 
Thus the peculiar feature of the setting of the European Monetary Union is that in the face of a 
single monetary policy, which is established at the level of the euro area as a whole, the fiscal 
policy remains under the direct responsibility of individual member states and is, therefore, 
inevitably fragmented. In fact, the EMU has followed an original design: it has a common currency, 
the euro, but does not have a federal budget and a major form of integrated financial supervision. 
This because the Maastricht Treaty has embodied a conscious political choice not to create a fully-
fledged economic union to accompany monetary union, thus creating a fundamental asymmetry in 
the institutional structure (Schilirò, 2002, 2006).  For this Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996) 
argued that EMU is an incomplete system, as it is based on a monetary union without fiscal union. 
It is well known that due to strong economic heterogeneity among member states of the European 
Monetary Union being formed, the Maastricht Treaty made the participation of a country into the 
European Monetary Union to a sufficient degree of convergence, compared to other countries, of 
certain financial and fiscal criteria (Schilirò, 2002). Actually the Maastricht criteria constrained 
governments in few aspects of heterogeneity only. More specifically, the sovereign debt of a 
country should not be more than 60 percent of its GDP and the annual increase in debt should not 
exceed 3 percent of GDP. In addition, the inflation rate should not be higher than that of the three 
most stable countries by more than 1.5 percent, the yield to maturity of long term-government 
bonds should not exceed that of the three most stable countries by more than 2 percent and the 
country should have been a member of the European Currency System for at least two years without 
devaluation of its currency. Of course, the creation of the single currency has led to the loss of 
exchange rate flexibility.  
Another essential rule of this institutional setting was the no-bailout clause, so that a member state 
in heavy financial difficulty or with liquidity problems could not be helped by other member states 
or by the European Central Bank. This no-bailout clause, which precludes the sharing of liability for 
government debt across Member States, has beeen codified in Art. 125 of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
2
 and by Art. 104, which rules out that national central 
                                                          
1
 The independence of ECB derives from Art. 282 of the EU Treaty (see Official Journal of the European Union, 2010) 
2
 However, Art. 122 provides an exception to this clause. When a member state is in difficulties or is seriously 
threatened by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, on a proposal from the Commission, the 
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banks or the ECB provide direct credit to public authorities, defined in a comprehensive sense. 
Once a country has joined the EMU, the two essential criteria became the 3 percent criterion 
regarding the deficit and the sovereign debt criterion
3
. Furthermore, to establish specific constraints 
to individual member states and precise rules that restrict the actions of the national governments in 
addition to the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, it was introduced the  Stability and Growth 
Pact
4
, which would have further limited the discretionary action of the member states of European 
Monetary Union. But in the subsequent revision of the Pact in 2005 the strictness of the 3% limit 
and the time frame for correcting excessive deficits were relaxed, while procedural deadlines were 
extended (Schilirò, 2006). This revison of the Pact have shown the operative difficulties to reconcile 
strict and flexible rules. 
Yet, the European monitoring mechanism focused itself exclusively on sovereign indebtedness, 
whereas other warning signals like wage increases, international competitiveness, etc. were ignored. 
This was probably due to the prevailing conviction that the convergence between national 
economies would be enforced by the market mechanism and by European directives which then 
would homogenize laws of the member states.  
The theoretical foundations that  have  justified the presence of specific criteria of fiscal discipline 
in the design of the EMU are  not strictly related to the theoretical paradigm of optimum currency 
areas (Mundell, 1961). An important aspect concerns the fact that the existence of independent 
monetary policy authority from political power is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure 
stable prices, but that this condition is actually strictly related to the behavior of fiscal authorities. 
Thus, to avoid problems of fiscal dominance or avoid adverse effects on the price level of 
potentially expansive fiscal policy is necessary to introduce a discipline with strong ties in the 
conduct of fiscal policy (Schilirò, 2006, 2011). Another aspect, already highlighted by Tabellini and 
Alesina (1990), concerns the opportunistic behavior of democratic governments elected in office 
that, following fiscal policies inconsistent and shortsighted, might prefer to leave excessive deficit 
to potential successors who will come to power, thus creating imbalances in debt policies among 
member countries of the EMU. Such opportunistic behavior makes it hard for the ECB to ensure 
stability. The Stability and Growth Pact has been designed just to ensure a supranational budgetary 
discipline, and that short-sighted and opportunistic behaviors of the member States sould be avoided 
or otherwise sanctioned.  On the other side, Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010) pointed out that 
although theoretically supra-national rules are welfare improving relative to merely national 
regimes, they cannot fully eliminate the deficit bias, which calls for strong national rules in addition 
to the supra-national ones. Yet the literature argues that the effectiveness of fiscal rules with respect 
to fiscal performance is not assured  (von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996). Some authors, for 
instance Ayuso-i- Casals et al. (2009), have shown that such effectiveness depend on the 
mechanisms established to enforce conformity with the rule and on the type of rule. Others, in 
particular  Buti et al. (2007),  have  shown fiscal rules to be effective, but also to lead to significant 
creative accounting aimed at their circumvention. 
Regarding the sanctions in case of violation of the debt criteria, the implicit assumption of the 
Maastricht Treaty appears to be that the sanctions are sufficient to force states back on a trajectory 
satisfying the Maastricht criteria, although there was a weak enforcement mechanism, even in the 
Stability and Growth Pact
5
.  The weakness of the Pact was due, however, to its weak enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Council of the Heads of the national governments may grant financial assistance to the member state under certain 
conditions. This clause is a way to make enter the political discretion in a crisis resolution. 
3
  If new debt is likely to exceed 3 percent of GDP, then the European Commission issues an early warning. If it 
actually exceeds 3 percent, then the Commission starts a deficit procedure. (For more details see Schilirò, 2006). 
4
 The Pact was established by the Resolution of the European Council held in Amsterdam on 17 June 1997. Later in the 
EU Council in Brussels on 22 and 23 March 2005 the Stability and Growth Pact was amended (Schilirò, 2006). 
5
 The 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact has increased the degree of discretion of the national governments 
of the euro members, since it implicitly accepted to tolerate possible fiscal deficits systematically higher in all countries 
of the euro area, but it also undermined the role of institutions. 
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provisions (ECB, 2008). Just consider that the provision of a qualified majority was required in the 
ECOFIN Council in order to approve further procedural steps. So countries with excessive deficits  
retained the right to vote and needed only a few additional countries – prospective deficit countries 
among them – to block such steps. 
In a monetary union such the EMU is obvious that coordination problems arise among member 
states, since these member States are independent states that must decide about their wage and labor 
market policy, their industrial policy, the monitoring of their banking system, etc. The coordination 
is doomed to be ineffective if there are conflicts of interest among the States, thus leading to  
imperfections in internal coordination. Actually, the institutional framework  of the EMU is based 
on decentralised policymaking, soft coordination and an insufficiently stringent enforcement of 
common rules. So the institutional framework established in the European monetary union has 
given the national policy a wide range of discretion, despite the Maastricth criteria and the Stability 
and Growth Pact. For instance, wage and price increases can be much higher in one state relative to 
the others. Another case is that a State may run a strong currency account deficit. Furthermore, the 
issue of monitoring by capital markets is never mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, if a 
State has a bad debt rating, no political action needs to be taken. Lastly, the issue of financial 
stability was not included in the governance of the euro, while all the emphasis has been placed by 
the ECB with regard to price stability. 
 
3. The crisis of the euro and the remedies put in place. 
 
In 2007, when the global financial crisis broke, the European Monetary Union had already deprived 
member governments of the monetary and exchange-rate instruments of macroeconomic 
management and, through the Stability Pact, it also tried to constrain the adoption of fiscal 
instruments. But since the euro area was not an optimal currency area, the imposition of one-size-
fits-all ECB interest rates produced asymmetric impulses in EMU economies, with effects above- 
average or below-average in terms of rates of growth and inflation. In particular,  the economies of 
the “GIPS”  (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), taking advantage of very low real interest rates, 
have spent and lived beyond their means by accumulating private and/or public debt and running 
large current account deficits. In fact they have relied on state spending to drive growth, so they 
have recorded high deficit/GDP ratio and rising public debt, in addition “GIPS” countries have 
fueled credit-financed economic growth and employment, but also rapid increases in unit labor 
costs that reduced export competitiveness (Baldwin et al., 2010; Schilirò, 2011). The resulting rise 
of current-account deficits was accommodated by equally rising capital inflows from investors in 
surplus economies leading to rising external debts accumulated primarily in the private sector. As a 
consequence, the economies of the “GIPS” were becoming extremely vulnerable to potential 
disturbances in international financial markets that might induce capital flight – followed by 
potential liquidity and solvency crises. 
This has created deep concerns about the fiscal sustainability and the credibility of whole euro area, 
especially because the GDP in the euro area has been growing much less than budget deficit and 
public debt, in fact over 2011, GDP increased only by 1.4 per cent. 
Table 1 shows that the average value of deficit/GDP ratio for the whole eurozone was 6.0 per cent 
in 2010 double than the 3 per cent fixed in the Maastricht Treaty , whereas  the average value of 
debt/GDP was 86.1 per cent, much higher than the 60 per cent benchmark. 
In particular, Greece has accumulated a huge sovereign debt, mainly due to public finance 
mismanagement
6
, so that its financial exposition prevented the Greeek government to find capital in 
the financial markets, therefore Greece has become at risk of sovereign default. Also Ireland has 
become at risk  because of the large private debt due to the mismanagement of its banks, thus the 
country cannot find  finance in the markets. Portugal was the third country of the euro area with an 
                                                          
6
 Greece have reported incorrectly the data on government finances, which have aggravated concerns. 
6 
 
high deficit, for whom the access to liquidity in financial markets was denied. These countries were 
forced to seek financial support. Lastly, Spain (like Ireland) is now suffering the most serious 
recession, since its real estate bubble is deflating with the related problems that ramify through the 
financial systems, while its budget deficit has greatly worsened. In this situation international 
capital markets reacted by demanding  higher risk premiums for continuing holding public debt of 
“GIPS”, but also of Italy, so the bond spreads have shot up.  
Growing current account imbalances were recorded between the countries of North and South of the 
euro area over time (Holinski et al. 2010). The crisis, actually, has exposed flaws in the peer review 
process which put disproportionate emphasis on fiscal discipline at the expense of equally relevant 
criteria such as current account deficits. 
The problem of current account imbalances between the “GIIPS” (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain), that is the countries with strong deficit of current accounts, on one side and Germany 
and other surplus countries, on the other, has been recently stressed and criticized by Werner-Sinn 
and Wollmershaeuser (2011)
7
. 
 
Table 1. Government Balance and Debt in Euro Area Coutries in 2010 
 
                        Deficit/GDP        Debt/GDP  
                            ded 
euro area countries government balance and debt in euro area countries 
Belgium                -4.1                    96.8 
Germany               -3.4                    83.2 
Ireland                 -32.4                    96.2 
Greece                 -10.5                   142.8 
Spain                     -9.2                    60.1 
France                   -7.0                    81.7 
Italy                      -4.6                   119.0 
Luxembourg          -1.7                     18.4 
Netherlands           -5.4                     62.7 
Austria                  -4.6                     72.3 
Portugal                 -9.1                    93.0 
Finland                  -2.5                    48.4 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Euro area               -6.0                     86.1 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011) 
 
The debt crisis of the euro area has highlighted that the euro system lacks the mechanism to resolve 
the crisis. In addition, the crisis has led to a more robust pursuit of the national interest, which 
usually comes to the fore in times of crisis. At the same time the bail-out clause (Art. 125 TFEU), 
devised to instil market discipline on policymakers through differentiated risk assessment in 
sovereign debt markets, proved to be ineffective and far from reality since the countries, although 
opposed to the bailouts, have been forced by events to accomplish them. But the debt crisis has also 
pointed out, according to Paul De Grauwe, that “there is no mechanism to ensure convergence of 
members’ competitive positions and thus to prevent major trade imbalance. This stems from the fact 
that economic policies (spending and taxation, social policies, wage policies, etc.) remain firmly in 
the hands of the member governments and members do not coordinate such policies”. Moreover, 
“there is no mechanism to resolve crises caused by these imbalances and divergent competitive 
                                                          
7
 They argue that  ECB and the European System of Central Banks has played a huge and improper role as lender of last 
resort to the banks of the euro area, in particular those of the countries with a current account deficits, since the crisis in 
the euro area  has become above all a balance of payments crisis. 
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positions. Consequently, Eurozone crisis management is ad hoc, time-consuming, and hindered by a 
lack of credibility.” (De Grauwe, 2010). 
The crisis of the euro also showed the weaknesses of the banking system in the euro area. The 
banks demonstrated not to be strong enough, but they are at the same time interconnected with the 
sovereign debts. The  fragility of banks and its interconnectedness with the debt crisis created  
severe macroeconomic problems, and also the risk of failure of banks in several countries of the 
euro area. Thus a pressing need has become to ensure the euro area a unique system of banking 
supervision and coordination
8
.  In short, the governance of the euro area revealed the lack of a 
coordinated banking policy, which is crucial for crisis management. 
In order to establish a new institutional framework to manage the crisis of the “GIIPS” but also and 
more generally the crisis of the euro, the European institutions have taken several decisions during 
2010 and 2011. First, in Spring  2010, the EU together with the IMF have decided a program of 
financial aids to help Greece since the country was on the verge of insolvency. To overcome the no 
bail-out clause the European Council approved the financial aids in the form of “coordinated 
bilateral loans” at non-discounted interest rates9.   
Second, ECB adopted an important measure, called “securities market programme” (SMP) by 
which ECB decided to buy government debt of fiscally challenged countries; in this way the ECB 
purchases government bonds, in secondary markets, in order to provide liquidity to alleviate 
pressures from sovereign debt risk 10. Also the member banks of the European System of Central 
Banks started buying government debt. This measure aimed at improving liquidity, reducing 
volatility in the financial markets so to reduce the spreads on the sovereign bonds
11
. The SMP was 
mainly active during 2 periods. The first started after the ECB Governing Council meeting on May 
14, 2010 and lasted until the week of July 9 2010. The second period  began the week of August 15, 
2011 and at the end of 2011 was still underway. 
Third, another very important decision to shape a new institutional framework to manage the crises 
was taken on May 9, 2010 when the 27 Member States of European Union agreed to create a 
comprehensive rescue package, a legal instrument aimed at ensuring financial stability in Europe:  
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a Luxembourg-registered company owned by 
Euro Area Member States, that has become operative in August 2010 and started to give credits to 
countries in financial  difficulties
12
. But  EFSF can also intervene in the debt primary and secondary 
markets; in particular, the intervention in the secondary market will be only on the basis of an ECB 
analysis recognising the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to 
financial stability.  The ESFF is devised in the form of a special purpose vehicle that will sell bonds 
and use the money it raises to make loans to eurozone nations in need. In practice the EFSF may 
issue bonds or other debt on the market in order to accumulate funds  with whom to lend to 
countries in the eurozone economic difficulties, recapitalising banks, or buying government bonds. 
EFSF is backed by guarantee commitments from the euro area Member States (in proportion to 
their paid-in capital to the European Central Bank) for a total of €780 billion and has a lending 
                                                          
8
 A first step, but still insufficient, was the creation of the European Banking Authority (EBA) by the European 
Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010. 
9
 Actually the interest rate paid on the loans to Greece (loans approved by the European Council in April 2010) by the 
Members States was 5 per cent, lower than the 7 per cent demanded by the markets. 
10
 To sterilize this move the ECB conducts liquidity absorbing operations of the same magnitude. In fact, the ECB is 
buying risky assets issued by a fiscally troubled governement of the eurozone and, via its sterilization operations, selling 
its claims on banks, which is equivalent of selling new assets. A move that has been viewed by some economists and 
financial analists as an improper risk transfer. 
11
 The creation of the SMP was closely related to the Greek debt crisis, but then it was helpful for sovereign debts of 
Spain and Italy. 
12
 The EFSF has been used to help the governments of Greece, Ireland and  Portugal. The Fund bases its rules of the 
crisis management regime on the principles and procedures of the “IMF doctrine”. The EFSF operates in case of 
unstainable fiscal policies and sovereign debt crises. 
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capacity of €440 billion13.  The bonds also will be backed by guarantees given by the European 
Commission representing the whole EU and the IMF(that can provide loans up to a maximum of 
250 billion euros). The EFSF will sell debt only after an aid request is made by a country. In 2011 
the EFSF issued securities for about 18.0 billion and granted loans to Ireland and Portugal, 
respectively, for 7.6 and 6.9 billion. The EFSF has also issued € 35 billion  of bonds for the 
activation of the scheme repurchase designed to support the quality of securities issued or fully 
guaranteed  from Greece. The EFSF is tasked to provide emergency financing until 2013 (Schilirò, 
2011). At the same in 2013 it should become operative the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) a 
permanent organization that will provide financial assistance to members of the euro area in 
financial difficulty (European Council, 2011b), replacing the existing temporary funding 
programmes such as EFSF and EFSM (the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism). The 
agreement reached by the leaders of the euro area concerning the EFSF was a typical political 
compromise. Unfortunately, compromise could not necessarily work in a debt crisis. There are, in 
essence, two ways to solve a debt crisis: through a bail-out or through default. The leaders of the 
euro area got itself an arrangement that represents only an emergency facility and constitutes a 
scarsely credible intermediate solution between bail-out and default
14
. 
On 16 December 2010 the European Council agreed an amendment to Article 136 of the TFEU
15
 
that says: “The member states whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any 
required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.” 
Later, on 11 July 2011 the European Stability Mechanism itself has been established by a treaty 
among the Member States of the euro area: the Treaty Establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism. The European Stability Mechanism becomes an intergovernmental organization under 
public international law, located in Luxembourg. It would be led by a Board of Governors. Each 
Member States would appoint a governor and the board would either be chaired by the President of 
the Euro Group or by a separate elected chair from amongst the governors themselves
16
. There is a 
disagreement among member States concerning the funding of ESM, since for the rescue of three 
countries Greece, Ireland and Portugal over two years of crisis between 2010 and 2011, euro area 
countries (Germany above all) have had to intervene for a total of 273 billion euros, plus other 130 
billion for the second loan to Athens. However, the worsening of the crisis of the euro, the risk that 
Greece could leave the euro area, seem to influence a decision to bring forward to 2012 the birth of 
the ESM, but nothing looks taken for granted. 
Fourth, again in March 2011 the European Council (2011a) agreed on a new plan, named the ‘Pact 
for the Euro’, which tries to design a new governance of the EMU and to achieve a better economic 
policy coordination for leading to a higher degree of convergence. The plan was advocated by the 
French and German governments and it is firstly designed as a more stringent successor to the 
Stability and Growth Pact, which has not been implemented consistently. In fact the ‘Pact for the 
Euro’ constitutes an attempt to give new and effective national budgetary rules. Actually the Pact 
has come out with four broad strategic goals along with more specific strategies for addressing 
these goals. The four goals are: fostering competitiveness, fostering employment, contributing to 
the sustainability of public finances, reinforcing financial stability. So this ‘Pact’ contains crisis 
management and resolution principles and procedures, that did not exist before, but also a wider 
economic policy framework to the Member States of the euro area. While the ‘Pact’ comes with 
                                                          
13
 EFSF has been assigned the best possible credit rating by Moody’s (Aaa) and Fitch Ratings (AAA). EFSF has been 
assigned a AA+ rating by Standard & Poor’s. The capacity of EFSF of achieving these “good” ratings depends on 
overcollateralization (that is by a shared assumption about the distribution of possible otcomes), which takes the form 
of guarantees by other eurozone countries. However, only France and Germany have a rating of AAA. 
14
 To deepen the technical aspects of the financial rescue mechanisms and their ineffective solutions see Schilirò (2011). 
15
 The amendement will not come into force until it has been ratified by each member state according to their respective 
constitutional requirements, and cannot come into force until 1 January 2013. 
16
  European Council (2011). 
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specific strategies, these are not seen as compulsory, the choice of the specific policy actions 
necessary to achieve the common objectives remains under the responsibility of each country. The 
aims and strategies of the ‘Pact’ are to be updated yearly with the following procedure: each year 
participating Member States will agree at the highest level on a set of concrete actions to be 
achieved within 12 months.  
A positive aspect included in this new economic policy framework is the recognition that not all 
crises are rooted in a lack of budgetary discipline. It is now agreed that financial stability and 
macroeconomic stability also matter. Yet several questions remain open, as for instance the true 
capacity and the will of each Member State to adopt the necessary measure to fulfill the 
requirements of the ‘Pact’, thus it remains an agreement on principles without a real enforcement. 
Daniel Gros (2011) correctly pointed out that the ‘Pact’ contains a list of desirable policy goals but 
no means to implement them.  In particular, the employment and competitiveness goals remain too 
vague, and are not really embedded in a framework which is clearly oriented to growth. As Darvas, 
Pisany-Ferry and Sapir (2011) have argued a success of any program to evercome a debt crisis is 
conditioned by the capacity of a country (like Greece) to meet the fiscal adjustment targets and also 
by the ability of the country’s economy of triggering the growth, since without stimulating growth 
any fiscal consolidation program will not succeed
17
. 
Finally, it is well known that the ECB has the restricted mandate of  look after to price stability in 
the euro area and has not the possibility of printing money to help the member countries in financial 
difficulties, so that it cannot be a lender of last resort as the Federal Reserve in the United States. 
However, in December 2011 ECB has launched a Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO), a 
program of making low-interest loans with a term of 3 years (36 months) and 1 per cent interest to 
European banks accepting loans from the portfolio of the banks as collateral
18
. This is an 
unconventional measure taken by ECB to offset the lack of liquidity that has occurred in the credit 
market.  
Despite the quite frequent meetings of the European Council in 2010 and 2011 (the Heads of the 
Government of the euro area made 13 meetings over the two years) and the three Euro Summits 
(one in 2010 and two in 2011),which produced the set of decisions above cited, the confidence in 
the euro is diminishing, because the markets and many observers (economists, opinion makers, 
businessmen, etc.) have the feeling that the European authorities still do not have governance 
mechanisms capable of making  important decisions and also implementing them. Moreover, the 
single currency, that should force the countries of the euro area to respond to the crisis in a unitary 
manner, has created, on the opposite, a situation in which all countries seem unwilling to act. Thus 
the hypothesis of  breaking the euro has become real, despite  the constant reassuring statements of 
European authorities (European Council, 2011c, 2011d), that deny this hypothesis.  
In the next section I examine the institutional aspects and the economic policy issues that have 
determined the crisis of the governance of the euro area. 
 
4. What’s wrong in the governance of the euro: institutional aspects and economic policy 
issues. 
 
The euro area is characterized by a crisis of governance. This is caused by many factors, but an 
important role has been played by the European authorities, who have pursued a strategy of small 
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 Greece is an economy which is recession since four years and the fiscal consolidation does not seem to lead the 
country on a virtuous path that allows the economy to get out of debt crisis and absence of growth. 
18
 In particular, on December 21 2011, the ECB has placed an auction with about 489.19 billion euros expiring on 
January 29, 2015 (and early payment option in a year) at an audience of 523 bidders in Europe. The rate of supply of 
liquidity was fixed on the reference 1 per cent and was expanded the range of assets that European banks could put as 
collateral  for these loans. This LTRO is primarily designed to provide greater bank liquidity, but it should also lower 
sovereign yields since euro area countries can use their own sovereign debt as collateral, which, in turn, increases 
demand for the bonds and lowers yields. 
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steps and not short times in the management of the crisis of the euro area. But now that the times of 
the economy and financial markets have become even more fast it is necessary to think about a 
different method. From this consideration it follows that the timing of the policy and its procedures, 
at European level but also at the level of the individual Member States, are too long compared to 
those of the economy and the markets. Moreover, there were two ways to proceed in the face of 
crisis: muddling through or adopting radical solutions. The European institutions have preferred to 
follow the first, thus following their traditional way of proceeding. In addition, the new governance 
of the euro, which is laboriously carried out by the European institutions and by the individual 
Member States, takes time; however, the path has been characterized by the statements of the 
European authorities that are often contradictory and contribute to uncertainty. This behavior  has 
caused negative reactions in the markets and makes more difficult to resolve the crisis. 
The European authorities showed instability in their decisions. At first they were very patient in 
financial terms, after too they became too much demanding with financial discipline. At the same 
time all the countries of the euro area  seem unwilling to act against the crisis. The virtuous 
members States  do not want to pay for those in difficulty, while the weaker countries are certainly 
not pleased with the sacrifices that Europe asks.  
The crisis also revealed some new facts about the governance of the euro area. Firstly, a greater 
intrusion of  European institutions (European Council, Ecofin, Eurogroup, ECB) in the lives of 
citizens of the Member States. Secondly, the crisis has caused the de-commissioning of the 
European Union: in fact, the European Council decides on its own the political and economic 
strategies without answering before the  Commission and the European Parliament. Another aspect 
of the emptying of the role of the Commission is represented by the fact that the Commission 
counts less while France and Germany are more influential. Thus, it has been established a kind of 
duopoly in the European governance. The France-Germany duopoly that has characterized the 
management of this crisis in the euro area has, de facto, changed the rules of governance
19
.   
A governance of the euro area that is effective, requires that the member states should adopt a 
coherent strategy made of three steps: coordination, decisions and actions. Coordination problems 
obviously arise among member states of a currency union, however a policy in which there is a high 
degree of coordination is crucial in the governance of the euro. But coordination must be followed 
by appropriate decisions where the cooperative attitude should prevail. Actions are also necessary, 
otherwise decisions remain  wishes without effects, consequently, effective mechanisms of 
enforcement of decisions are needed.  
Unfortunately the EU is a hybrid system, on some issues the governments of various countries are 
willing to accept the decisions at European level, on the other they claim national sovereignty. 
The institutional framework of the European Monetary Union, in particular, appeared, since its 
inception, clearly incomplete and inadequate. Examples of inadequacy of the institutional 
architecture are: the relationship between the Member States of the euro area and the EU 
institutions is unclearly defined, because of the strong interests of the Member States. Thus, 
national interests still prevail over the interest of Europe and within the European institutions. But 
also important problems are the mismatch between the growing number of policies decided by the 
European Union  and the policies carried out at national level, and also the lack of a effective policy 
at European level that is able to decide on economic issues and to implement them. These problems 
create an unstable environment and  negative consequences, which have become more evident in 
the euro crisis. 
And yet, it looks awkward the position of the ten Member States of non-euro area, who sit in the 
European Council but do not express themselves on the issues concerning the euro area. Although 
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such decisions influence as well the non euro area members. There is, therefore, a problem of 
transparency and legitimacy in the decision process at institutional level (Schilirò, 2011). 
I firmly believe that a set of policy measures should be taken to enable the euro area to survive. 
First, an immediate and credible program to deal with excessive sovereign debt and achieve debt 
sustainability particularly in the economies of the PIIGS, since the creation of EFSF or of ESM do 
not appear in the current state a convincing answer to solve the problem. Moreover, the eurobonds 
may be not the correct solution to the sovereign debt crisis since they tend to solve the problem 
through the socialization of the debt
20
. Instead it is more appropriate to adopt a policy, based on 
coordination, to overcome the dysfunctional politics across the Member States and to avoid the 
negative external effects of the macroeconomic imbalances. This policy, aiming at the creation of a 
fiscal union in the euro area,  should offer reciprocal insurance to Member Sates and reduce income 
volatility within the region, so to affect the root of the problem.  In any case, it is necessary a far 
more aggressive plan to reduce budget deficits with binding fiscal rules for the Member States, that 
even the ‘Pact for the Euro’ does not guarantee, therefore it is required the introduction of 
mechanisms that credibly achieve medium-term fiscal sustainability. But it is very crucial, make the 
economies of the “PIIGS” more competitive in the near future with structural reforms that are 
framed or bound at EU level. In fact – as Kirkegaard (2011) also emphasized – “without improving 
external competitiveness and, at the same time, increasing exports/reducing  imports, the euro area 
periphery will not be able to restore domestic economic growth during their prolonged period of 
fiscal consolidation”.  Of course, a supportive monetary policy from the ECB is needed, while the 
ECB should become de jure or de facto a lender of last resort with respect to the governments and 
the banks. This wider role of the ECB will allow a more strong and effective monetary policy and 
economic policy of the euro area on the whole. Furthermore, it is very important the good health of 
the banking system, since many European banks still have in their balance sheet too many “toxic 
assets” and risky sovereign bonds. Lastly, an institutional change must implemented, that reduces 
the instability in the financial sector.  
I also believe that, since the euro area have shown during its crisis strong macroeconomic 
imbalances, it can be helpful to envisage a new economic policy strategy. To avoid that the euro 
area becomes a transfer union, Carfì and Schilirò (2010, 2011, 2012) have suggested a policy 
strategy based on coopetition. First, they have pointed out the primary role of competitiveness in 
determining growth and the relation between competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances. 
Carfì and Schilirò have argued that to overcome macroeconomic imbalances it is necessary a 
medium term strategy for competitiveness and growth, based on innovative investments and a 
process of structural change of the production system (Schilirò, 2008). Within this broad strategy, 
current account imbalances, in particular, can be addressed through a coopetitive strategy, which 
implies a cooperative attitude aiming at growth among the member countries of the euro area, 
despite their divergent interests. The coopetitive strategy will provide a win-win solution to the 
actors of the game and can constitute a new macroeconomic policy tool to help solving the 
imbalances problems and contribute to overcome the economic crisis in a medium-run perspective. 
The euro area is therefore characterized by strong imbalances, and the governance of the euro 
appears inadequate to address these  imbalances. The experience of the current crisis where every 
Member State fights alone against its disequilibrium in sovereign debt or in current account 
demonstrates the failure of this policy strategy. The coopetitive strategy is a viable and effective 
way to overcome the isolation of individual countries before the crisis. However, a more stable and 
comprehensive solution for the governance of the euro area requires a deep change  at institutional 
level. This change of governance demands a greater European integration, with a central fiscal 
entity at European level which requires a transfer of sovereignty from the individual Member States 
and the European Central Bank that becomes lender of last resort. But also a different relationship 
between the member countries of the euro zone that, barring the duopoly France and Germany and, 
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de facto, the German leadership, give to the Commission the role of coordinator and of third party, 
return to the European institutions such ECB, Ecofin, Eurogroup their proper and independent role 
and give to the European Parliament its centrality. 
 
Conclusions. 
 
The euro crisis has made the pessimism regarding the euro area more prevalent.  For over two years 
European authorities and political leaders have promised to do whatever it is needed to save the 
euro area, but problems remain unsolved and solutions seem quite far.The euro area is currently in 
recession with high unemployment and strong macroeconomic imbalances between the various 
Member States. Moreover, the prolonged stand-off over the rescue plan for Greece, the 
corresponding risk of a sovereign default which could spread to Portugal, Spain and Ireland and the 
financial difficulties of Italy have definetely brought a gloomy picture of the European currency 
union. All this, in turn, highlighted the profound weaknesses in the governance of the euro area, the 
uncertainties of the European authorities, and posed the issue of German leadership. 
In this work I have analyzed the institutional framework of the euro area, discussing the issue of the 
rules and of the discretion in the governance of the euro. I have also examined the remedies put in 
place by the European authorities to overcome the crisis and their flaws. The last section of the 
work has  focused on institutional aspects of the governance of the euro and on economic policy 
issues that the crisis in the euro area have stressed, suggesting some basic outline for the new 
institutional architecture and feasable economic policy solutions. These solutions imply a more 
strong European political integration where the European institutions  coordinate and are capable of 
implementing the economic policy for the whole euro area, with a central fiscal entity at European 
level and the European Central Bank that becomes lender of last resort. Only in this way it is 
possible to restore credibility in the euro area, create a stable macroeconomic environment, 
stimulate the economic growth so to overcome this long and hard crisis. 
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